1
Experiment Design Details
Design overview
Below is a table that gives an overview of all experimental treatments and the modules which our subjects participated in. The experimental design consists of five modules. The first module, "Injunctive Norms I", elicits subjects' beliefs about normative expectations, and in aggregate, identifies the social norm for that decision context. In the second module, "Descriptive Norms A", subjects are asked to guess the modal transfer amount and the percent of subjects who transferred the minimum and maximum amount. "Descriptive Norms B"subjects are asked to guess the average first order and second order beliefs of subjects in the KL experiments. Thus, the second module elicits important moments of a subject's belief about the descriptive norm. In the third module, "Observation", subjects see the token transfer decisions of five other subjects who participated in the Kessler and Leider study (observations are chosen randomly from the whole distribution of actions, randomly from the whole distribution with upper-quartile bias, or randomly from the whole distribution with lower-quartile bias). Thus, the third module gives subjects information about the actual distribution of the descriptive norm and, depending on where in the distribution the observations are drawn, is in accordance or at odds with a subject's beliefs about that distribution. The fourth, "Injunctive Norms II", module elicits the injunctive norm again for the same decision context. The fifth module elicits variables we wish to control and includes incentivized measures of altruism and demographic information. Regardless of the treatment condition, all subjects participate in all modules 1-5 and the order in which subjects see modules 1 through 5 is always the same. In all cases, subjects are informed of their individual earnings only after all experimental modules have been completed. Figure S1 depicts the decision screen subjects saw for the Double Dictator Game. We ask respondents to judge the social appropriateness of each action on a six point scale that ranges over "very socially inappropriate" to "very socially appropriate." Figure S1 : Screen shot of the decision screen subjects saw in Module 1 (injunctive norm elicitation)
Screen shot of the norm elicitation screen

Payments and participation rate
A total of 358 participants were recruited in 36 sessions. Sessions were conducted using an even number of participants, ranging from 6 to 22 per session and the average length of each session was one hour and fifteen minutes. All experimental instructions were read aloud and shown on a screen. The average payoff for each subject was $29.72. Table S2details participation and average payoffs by treatment. 
The distribution of injunctive norm ratings from Module 1
The presence of an agreement also affects the variance in subjects' judgments of an action's appropriateness. We can think of the variance in appropriateness ratings as a measure of the concentration of beliefs about social norms which may plausibly affect how much concern, γ from equation (1), an individual places on complying with social norms relative to monetary payoffs. The Figures S2-S5 depict the standard errors for each game and treatment. In both games we find that the variance in ratings increases dramatically for higher actions in the No Agreement treatment -that is, subjects on average think higher actions are more appropriate, but they are poorly coordinated on how much more appropriate (i.e., what the utility payoff will be from taking these actions). In particular, the rating for 'action 10' in the Double Dictator Game has a higher variance in the No Agreement treatment than each of the ratings for 'action 8' or lower actions (robust variance test: p < 0.01 for all), and similarly the rating for 'action 100' in the Bertrand Game has a higher variance than the ratings for any action of 96 or less (p < 0.01 for all).
However, in the Double Dictator Game treatment with Agreement we find much more variance in the ratings about the appropriateness of intermediate actions, but less variance about the appropriateness of 'action 10'. We also see that there is significantly less disagreement about the appropriateness of 'action 10' in the Agreement treatment than in the No Agreement treatment (p < 0.01), and similarly that there is significantly less disagreement about the appropriateness of choosing 'action 100' in the Bertrand Game in the Agreement treatment than in the No Agreement treatment (p < 0.01). These results are consistent with hypothesis 3. We can use box plots as an alternative way of looking at the distribution of injunctive norm ratings, as shown in Figure S6 -S9. We can see that when there is no agreement, more than 50% of subjects have different opinions about how appropriate the highest action is in both the Double Dictator Game and the Bertrand Game, while almost all subjects agree that the highest action is very socially appropriate when there is an agreement. This is consistent with what we find through average rating-variance plots, and tells us that agreement does make it easier to coordinate. We can demonstrate this result another way by looking at how many subjects rate taking action '10' in the Double Dictator Game and taking '100' in the Bertrand Game as the highest rated (most appropriate) action. For the Double Dictator Game 64 percent say taking action '10' is their highest rated action when there is 'no agreement' but 94 percent say so when there is a handshake agreement. In the Bertrand Game the percentage is 57 and 90 percent respectively for taking action '100' (test of proportions: p < 0.01 for both).Similarly, we can examine how many subjects rate taking action '10' in the Double Dictator Game' and taking '100' in the Bertrand Game as the uniquely highest action (that is, no other action receives a higher or equal appropriateness rating). Here we find that in the Double Dictator Game this is 19 percent when there is no agreement and 76 when there is an agreement, and in the Bertrand Game this is 21 percent and 83 percent respectively (test of proportions: p < 0.01 for both). These findings clearly demonstrate that informal agreements decrease the variance between subjects in how appropriate the agreed-upon action is allowing them to coordinate more effectively in evaluating the appropriateness of the action.
Evidence that in the Bertrand Game the agreement changes the social norm
Qualitative data collected at the end of our session supports the interpretation that social norms fundamentally change when there exists an agreement in the Bertrand Game. In the situation where there is no agreement, subjects appear to rely on a norm of risk minimization but rely on a norm of honoring obligation when an agreement has been reached. Thus, as an example, a subject in the No Agreement condition stated the following reason for his appropriateness ratings: "I felt that the higher options were more inappropriate because of the risk factor so the ones in the middle were somewhat appropriate, and the ones that were from 0-10 were inappropriate because you would win little or no money". However, when there was an agreement subjects used different language to describe the thoughts that guided their appropriateness ratings. As an example, a subject in our Agreement condition wrote: "I thought that any action that violated A and B's agreement was socially inappropriate regardless of A's resulting pay off." (1) and (2) is the difference in norm rating for the highest and second highest action, for (3) and (4) it is the difference between the norm rating for the middle action and the average rating of the actions one higher and one lower; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
We analyze the effect of the Agreement treatment on the shape of the appropriateness profile more formally in Table S3 . Here we construct two summary measures for the jump in ratings for the highest action, and for the middle action. Specifically, we define the "top jump" for each subject as the difference in their rating for the highest action and the second-highest action, and we define the "middle jump" as the difference between their rating for the middle action and the average rating for the two neighboring actions. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 we see that there is an increase in the ratings difference in the Double Dictator Game of 1.9 appropriateness categories in the presence of a handshake agreement, and an increase in the difference of 2.7 appropriateness categories in the Bertrand Game with an agreement. In columns 3 and 4 we see that there is no difference between treatments in the shape of the ratings around the middle action in the Double Dictator Game (column 3), while in the Bertrand Game the peak at 50 exists only in the No Agreement Treatment (column 4). Taken together with the qualitative data, this evidence is consistent with an interpretation that subjects seem to apply different social norms in the Bertrand game when there is an agreement and where there is not.
3
Robustness Checks
Overview and summary of robustness checks
In order for the coordination task to accurately measure the effect of the agreement on the norms profile, and thus have the measured norm profile be useful for predicting behavior, we would like the responses to the coordination task to be robust to competing focal points. First, ratings ought not be overly sensitive to individual characteristics. Second, while social norms regarding what one ought to do provide focal points that subjects can rely on in the coordination games, beliefs about the descriptive norm (what people actually do) might also serve as focal points. This would be an undesirable property of the incentivized coordination task because beliefs about what people actually do reflect beliefs regarding how actors trade-off between both a desire to comply with social norms and the payoffs associated with a particular action. Third, it may be that the effect of agreements on the norm profile is strongly determined by the fact that subjects are reading a vignette in which the individuals in the story agree on the Pareto efficient action in the Agreement treatments. This would be undesirable as it would imply that what we are interpreting as an effect of agreements on the norms profile may in fact just be the effect of taking a Pareto efficient action on the norms profile. We examine all three of these concerns in detail in the rest of the appendix, and we summarize our strategy and results here.
In section 3.2 of this appendix we explore the effect of subject beliefs on the elicited norm ratings. To do so, we divide subjects into two categories, for each game and each treatment condition, based on their stated belief (elicited in Module 2) about the modal action taken in the original KL experiment: those whose beliefs are above the median belief or below the median belief in their respective treatment. We then calculate the average appropriateness ratings (from Module 1) for each action for those two groups. We find that subjects with more optimistic beliefs about what others will do tend to have lower ratings for low actions, and higher ratings for high actions. However, the shapes of the norm functions are preserved and it is, therefore, clear that the major changes in the shape of the norm function in the presence of agreements is not driven by beliefs. Put differently, it does not appear that subjects' are relying on their own beliefs regarding others' actions as focal points in the coordination game.
A second way to examine whether responses in the coordination game are robust to competing focal points, is to show subjects the actual choices that KL's subjects made. That is, just as beliefs about others' actions can create focal points, so too can observing others' behavior. It would be an undesirable property of the coordination task if the norms ratings were overly sensitive to observing a handful of others' behavior as this would suggest that norms aren't creating particularly salient focal points in this task or that focal points stemming from norms can be easily substituted with other focal points. Module 3 shows our subjects five randomly drawn actions from what other subjects actually did in KL's experiment. After observing what others actually did, our subjects perform the same injunctive norm rating tasks as in Module 1. This allows us to conduct an analysis of the effects of observation on norm ratings. To do so, we divided our subjects up into whether they observed draws that were "upper tail biased", "lower tail biased" or "random from the whole distribution". We then test whether (a) observing others' behavior affects a subject's norm ratings and (b) whether elicited beliefs about norms are sensitive to observing behavior that is inconsistent with one's beliefs about the descriptive norm.
In Section 3.3 we analyze how these different observation treatments affect the norm measured by the second elicitation. First, we test within subject whether the norm profile changes significantly. While in a few cases the appropriateness ratings for the observed actions increases slightly, the differences are small. Additionally, while the difference in the rating to the (promised) highest action and the next highest decreases slightly in the Agreement treatment, the jump is still quite large in both games, and much higher than in the No Agreement treatment. Additionally, using regression analysis, we find that observing behavior, whether drawn randomly or from the upper or lower tail of the distribution, has no significant effect on appropriateness ratings in the second injunctive norm elicitation stage. Thus, we can rule out that subjects use beliefs about what others do as focal points and we can assert that norm ratings are resilient to observations of others' behavior.
A third way to examine whether responses in the coordination game are robust to competing focal points is to examine whether subjects use their own preferences to create focal points. In section 3.4 we use subject choices in the 'Advice Game' and the 'Helping Game' to create proxy measures of individual norm-compliance to test whether responses in the norm elicitation module differ by whether someone is particularly norm-sensitive. One might expect that if subjects are using their own preferences (rather than beliefs about the social norm) to internally generate focal points in the coordinating task, then subjects who care about pro-and prescriptive norms (both or just one) may provide different injunctive norms ratings than those who care less. However, we find no difference in the injunctive norms ratings along these personal characteristics or using demographic characteristics.
Finally, in Section 3.5we describe two additional norm elicitation sessions for the Double Dictator Game and the Bertrand Game where subjects agree on an action other than the Pareto efficient one. This will allow us to test the effect of an informal agreement on a non-Pareto efficient action on the social norms profile. In the Double Dictator Game we elicited social norms profiles from subjects who read about a scenario in which the agreement between the two parties was to transfer 7 tokens and in the Bertrand Game they read a scenario in which the individuals agreed to take action 70. We find that agreeing on 'action 7' makes it significantly more appropriate to take 'action 7' than when there is no agreement. We find no difference in the appropriateness ratings for taking 'action 7' and 'action 10' when no agreement has been reached. Our findings are similar for the Bertrand Game. These results support our interpretation of the coordination ratings as a reflection of the effect of agreements on the social norm profile rather than a reflection of a norm to take the Pareto efficient action.
Taken together, this additional analysis is important because it bolsters our claim that responses we elicit in Module 1 are not sensitive to the type of person we obtain them from, to other reasonable focal points (beliefs about or observation of others' behavior), nor are they reliant on agreements over actions that are also the social optimum.
Norm ratings for subjects with different beliefs about the descriptive norm
In order for handshake agreements to have general and consistent effects on behavior, we would like these agreements to evoke social norms that are not overly sensitive to particularly optimistic/pessimistic beliefs about what actions people actually take. Furthermore, while social norms regarding what one ought to do provide focal points that subjects can rely on in the coordination games, beliefs about the descriptive norm (what people actually do) might also serve as focal points. Thus, a change in the norms ratings across treatments could be consistent with subjects using either beliefs about the injunctive or the descriptive social norm to suggest focal points. To explore the effect of beliefs on norm ratings, for each game and each treatment condition, we divide subjects into two categories based on their stated belief for the modal action taken in the original Kessler and Leider experiment: those whose beliefs are above the median belief or below the median belief for their treatment. We then calculate the average appropriateness ratings for each action for those two groups. Figures 10a-10b and Figures 11a-11b report these average ratings.
Figure S10a-S10b: Average appropriateness ratings for subjects who guessed that modal behavior was above and below the median in each treatment of the Double Dictator game Beliefs do appear to make a difference in subjects' perceived norms -subjects with more optimistic beliefs tend to have lower ratings for low actions, and higher ratings for high actions. However, it is clear that the major difference in the shape of the norm function between treatments is not primarily driven by beliefs: in particular there is a large increase in appropriateness ratings for sending 10 tokens, rather than 9 tokens, and for choosing Action 100 instead of action 9, for both belief groups in the Agreement treatment that is not present for either belief group in the No Agreement treatment. Similarly there is a larger increase in the appropriateness of choosing Action 100 instead of Action 99 for both belief groups in the Agreement treatment than in the No Agreement treatment.
Figure S11a-S11b. Average appropriateness ratings for subjects who guessed that modal behavior was above and below the median in each treatment of the Bertrand Game
To support this conclusion, we regress 'appropriateness ratings' obtained from 'Injunctive Norm, initial' on beliefs in addition to the variables in Table 1 in the paper, and summarize the regression results in Table S4 . Columns 1 and 3 repeat our third specifications Table 1 in the paper, while columns 2 and 4 add the additional control for subjects' belief about the modal action. While the coefficient on beliefs is significant in both specifications, comparing columns 2 and 4 to 1 and 3, we can see that adding beliefs has no, or only a small, effect on the other coefficients. We may thus conclude that the difference in the perceived appropriateness of each action, and in particular the promised action, between the Agreement and No Agreement treatment does not appear to be driven by a shift in beliefs. That is, subjects are not using beliefs about what is actually done as focal points for coordination when we elicit the injunctive norm. Rather, when asked to match on the degree to which actions are considered "socially appropriate," subjects attempt to do exactly that -they try to predict the appropriateness with which others would view the actions. Similarly, we can conclude that handshake agreements have a consistent and general effect on social norms.
The effect of observing behavior on norm ratings
Recall that subjects observe 5 randomly drawn actions from what subjects actually did in KL's experiment. To test how sensitive individuals' perception of injunctive norms are after observing actions that are consistent or inconsistent with what they believe most other people would do, we show subjects five randomly drawn observations and then ask them to rate the social appropriateness of each action again. In the "upper tail biased" draw ("lower tail biased"), the five observations contain three observations from the upper tail (lower tail) of the distribution, one from the middle and one from the lower tail (upper tail) of the distribution. Thus, depending on which 'observation condition' subjects were in, they were exposed to a different descriptive norm: one where either a majority of decisions come from the upper or lower portion of the action space.
Tables S5 -S8report the distribution of behavior observed by Kessler and Leider for the Double Dictator Game and the Bertrand Game, with and without agreement treatments. For the Double Dictator Game, action '0' and '1' are categorized as "Bottom" actions, '2' to '7'as "Middle" actions, and '8' to '10'as "High" actions. In the Bertrand Game, actions consisting of the bottom 20% are categorized as "Bottom" actions, 20% to 80% as "Middle" actions, and top the 20% as "Top" actions. In these tables, column 1 reports the actions (or ranges of actions) that Kessler and Leider subjects can choose to take; column 2 reports the number of subjects who actually choose that action (or whose actions fall within that range); column 3 and 4 report the percentage of subjects choosing that action and the cumulative probability of that percentage. We use this data to randomly draw 5 observations that we show subjects in the norms rating experiments.
FiguresS12-S15 plot the distribution of behavior Kessler and Leider observe in the four treatments, with vertical bars showing the cut-offs for each of the Bottom, Middle or Top distribution groups from which we drew the observations that we showed subjects in Module 3.Figures S12 and S13 (supported by Tables S5 and S6) demonstrate that in the Double Dictator Game the presence of an informal agreement significantly decreases the number of '0 token transfers' and significantly increases the number of '10 token transfers' as prescribed by the informal agreement. Figures S14 and S15 (supported by Tables S7 and S8) demonstrate that in the Bertrand Game, an informal agreement significantly increases the number of subjects who choose the risky but socially beneficial action (100), rather than safe and profitable actions. 
Figure S15: Histogram showing the distribution of actions in the Bertrand Game with agreement
Figures S16a and S16b show the average norm rating for the first and second injunctive norm elicitation for the Double Dictator Game (with and without agreement). While observing the actions of subjects who played the game does appear to have a small effect on the measured norms in a few cases, the effect is relatively subtle and does not substantially change the overall norm. To test for differences in the profile of norm ratings we use a within-subject Figures S17a and S17bshow the average norm rating for the first and second injunctive norm elicitation for the BG (with and without agreement). Again, observing subject actions has a relatively small effect on the measured norms. We find a significant difference in the overall profile for the Random and Low treatments with No Agreement (p = 0.0135 and p= 0.0574), but no significant differences for any observation treatment when there is an Agreement. The Top Jump decreases significantly for the High treatment with No Agreement (mean: 0.58 vs 0.15l; p 0.0532), as well as in the High (mean: 3.77 vs 3.31; p = 0.0083), Random (mean: 3.75 vs 3.36; p = 0.0295) and Low treatments (mean: 3.29 vs 2.60; p = 0.0003) with an Agreement. There were no significant differences in the Mid Jump variable. Table S9reports a regression testing the effect of "observation" on responses in the social norms elicitation module of our experiment. The types of observation ('high observation' or 'low observation') are dummy variables where the omitted category is those subjects who observations that were drawn randomly from the whole distribution. The dependent variable is Notes: Dependent variable is the norm rating for each action in the second norm elicitation module; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Individual Heterogeneity in Norm Ratings
In a final effort to examine the robustness of our claims and findings, we show that injunctive norm measures obtained in Module 1 are not different for those subjects who might be characterized as particularly pro-social. To do this, we examine individual choices in the 'Advice Game', the 'Helping Game' and responses from the demographic questionnaire.
In the 'Advice Game', each participant is anonymously paired with a counterpart for a one-time decision. There are two options: Option A pays $10 to the first mover and $5 to the second mover, while Option B pays the reverse amount. The first mover's only action is to send a message to the second mover that a particular action will give the second mover a higher payoff. The second mover's only action is to decide which option is implemented but he is not told the payoffs associated with the options. We characterize first movers in the 'Advice Game' who send an honest message and believe that the second mover will follow their advice as "Honest", those who send an honest message but do not believe that the second mover will follow their advice as "strategic honest", those who send a message that is a lie and believe that the second mover will take their advice as "liars", and those who send a lying message but who do not believe that the second mover will take their advice as "altruistic liars". Thus, actions coupled with beliefs by the first mover in the 'Advice Game' allow us to characterize subjects who have some willingness to adhere to social norms against lying (those are the "altruistic liars" and "honest" subjects) and those who have a lower willingness to adhere to social norms against lying (those are the "strategic honest" and "liar" subjects).
In the 'Helping Game', subjects are randomly and anonymously re-matched into a pair, and each of them is assigned a different role. One member of the pair is in the helping role and has $12 while the other has $0. Subjects in the helping role can increase their matched participants' earnings by $6 if they pay a price $P, where the amount $P is drawn randomly between $0 and $6. Subjects in the helping role state the highest amount of $P that they are willing to pay, the computer randomly draws the price and determines whether the price is above the stated willingness to pay. We characterize those helpers whose willingness to pay is among the top range of all helpers as the "high helpers", those subjects whose willingness to pay is among the middle range of all helpers as the "middle helpers", and those whose willingness to pay is among the bottom range of all helpers as the "low helpers".
1 Thus, higher actions of helpers in the 'Helping Game' can be used to characterize subjects who may feel more strongly about adhering to social norms of helping than those helpers who choose lower actions.
Taken together, the 'Advice Game' and the 'Helping Game' can be thought of as measures of willingness to comply with a proscriptive ("do not lie") social norm and a prescriptive ("do help others") norm. One might expect that subjects who care about pro-and prescriptive norms (both or just one) may provide different injunctive norms ratings than those who do not care. However, what we find is that there is no difference in the injunctive norms ratings along these personal characteristics. Notes: Dependent variable is the norm rating for each action; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Table S10 summarizes the regression results for the 'Advice Game' (Column (1) and (3)) and 'Helping Game' (Column (2) and (4)).
2 We create dummy variables based on these categorizations and find that there is no significant difference in the injunctive norm appropriateness ratings from Module 1 among the player types in the 'Advice Game' in either the Double Dictator Game ("lair", "altruistic lair", and "strategic honest" respectively, p=0.760, p=0.613, p=0.715) or the Bertrand Game ("lair", "altruistic lair", and "strategic honest" respectively, p=0.802, p=0.944, p=0.707) .There is also no significant difference in appropriateness ratings among player types in the 'Helping Game' in the Double Dictator Game ("high" and "middle" helper respectively, p=0.379, p=0.371) or in the Bertrand Game ("high" and "middle" helper respectively p=0.221, p=0.287). 3 We interpret these results as reassuring in that they demonstrate that that the norms rating task is not affected by whether subjects care about pro-and pre-scriptive norms (both or just one) or don't care at all. Table S11 reports regression testing the effect of individual characteristics on injunctive norm ratings. There is no significant gender difference in appropriateness ratings (p=0.215 for gender dummy in the Double Dictator Game; p=0.883 in the Bertrand Game). Notes: Dependent variable is the norm rating for each action; robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The effect on norm ratings of an agreement on an action that is not Pareto efficient
We also ran two additional sessions for the Double Dictator Game and the Bertrand Game to test the effect of agreement on the social norms profile for taking an action other than the Pareto efficient one. Figures S16 and S17 report the appropriateness ratings of those sessions compared with the treatments without agreement and the treatment where the agreement is action 10 (in the Double Dictator Game) or action 100 (in the Bertrand Game). In the Double Dictator Game, Figure S16 , we can see that agreeing on 'action 7' makes it significantly more appropriate than taking that action when there is no agreement (p < 0.001), or the agreement is on another action (p < 0.001). It is also significantly more appropriate than taking 'action 6' (p < 0.001), though not different from taking 'action 8' (p = 0.1338). In addition, agreeing on 'action 7' does not change the appropriateness rating of other actions -the rating of taking 'action 0' when the agreement is to take 'action 7' is not significantly different from taking 'action 0' when there is an agreement on taking 'action 10' (p = 0.238). The rating for taking 'action 10' when the agreement is to take 'action 7' is not significantly different from taking 'action 10' when there is no agreement to take 'action 7' (p = 0.949).
We have similar findings for the Bertrand Game ( Figure S17 ). Taking 'action 70' when there is an agreement on that action makes it significantly more acceptable than its neighboring actions (p < 0.001). The agreed upon action (70) is also rated higher than the same action in the other two conditions (p < 0.001 in both cases). Like the condition where an agreement on 'action 100' exists, there is no jump of ratings for the action in the middle in the no agreement condition (p = 0.5282 when compared with 'action 50' in that condition). However, when subjects read about a scenario where both parties have agreed to take 'action 70', then the rating for taking 'action 100' is significantly lower than taking 'action 100' when the is no agreement or taking 'action 100' when there is an agreement to take 'action 100' (p < 0.001 and p = 0.0024 respectively).
Figure S17: Average appropriateness ratings in the Bertrand Game without agreement, with agreement on action 100,and with agreement on 'action 70' Figure S18and S18report the variances of the appropriateness ratings for each action in the Double Dictator Game and the Bertrand Game. In both games we find that the variance in ratings increase dramatically for higher actions, that is, subjects on average think higher actions are more appropriate, but they are poorly coordinated on how appropriate these actions are. In addition, the variances around agreed upon actions are much smaller. 
Comparing Lying Aversion Specifications
In Table S12 we compare three possible functional forms for lying aversion: a fixed cost of lying, a linear cost of lying and a quadratic cost of lying. We focus on the Agreement treatment (since the lying aversion model makes no prediction for the No Agreement case). It is not possible to estimate the linear cost model on the DDG data, as the lying cost is perfectly colinear with the monetary payoff for each actions. 
Combining Lying Aversion with Inequality Aversion
Since Lying Aversion reverts to the selfish model in the No Promise case, and given the relatively high actions even in the case where subjects do not make a promise, it is perhaps not surprising that Lying Aversion alone does not do a particularly good job explaining our data. We therefore consider a specification that combines lying aversion with inequality aversion (as well as a specification with inequality aversion alone). The results are reported in Table S13 . We find that this specification has a good overall fit, with a BIC of 2574.27 in the DDG and 4825.51 in the BG. However, in the DDG, the quality of fit seems to be driven entirely by the inequality aversion. The model with only IA actually has a better fit than the combined model with a BIC of 2567.02. Additionally in the combined model the coefficient on Lying Aversion is not significant (albeit with a negative point estimate of -0.044). In the BG the model with IA alone has a slightly worse fit than the combined model (a BIC of 4960.77). However, both models have a substantially improved fit over the model with only lying aversion (a BIC of 5511.49), which again suggests that inequality aversion is providing most of the fit. Notes: The dependent variable is the chosen action in the Double Dictator Game and Bertrand Game; standard errors are reported in parentheses with bootstrapped standard errors in brackets for specifications with norm ratings; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each observation represents a subject's choice in a particular period. For the conditional logit estimate each observation corresponds with 11 possible alternatives for the DG and 101 possible alternatives for the BG.
There is no direct reason why inequality aversion would predict different behavior between the treatments -the only reason why it can account for different action choices in the promise treatment is that the estimation is using the stated beliefs from the individual subject (leading to a different belief about the level of inequality for a given action across treatments). However, the model does not generate, and cannot explain, this difference in beliefs. The social norms model, however, both predicts such a difference in beliefs, and separately predicts a direct change in actions. In Table S14 we re-estimate the conditional logit models with 500 bootstrap replications where in each replication we randomly permute the beliefs across subjects in both treatments. In this way we can turn off the belief channel to identify the direct effect of the various preference models. In both games we now find that the Inequity Aversion models are no longer able to explain subject choices well. Instead, both of the Norms models are now the best fitting models by far. Across both games the norms component of utility remains large and positive despite the scrambled beliefs. Hence we believe that models including social norm information provide the best explanation for the effect of promises on behavior. Notes: The dependent variable is the chosen action in the Double Dictator Game and Bertrand Game; standard errors are reported in parentheses with bootstrapped standard error; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each observation represents a subject's choice in a particular period. For the conditional logit estimate each observation corresponds with 11 possible alternatives for the DG and 101 possible alternatives for the BG. Each estimation involves 500 bootstrap replications where the subject beliefs were permuted randomly across treatments in each replication.
